(3) The more prickly role played by internationalized asset markets in the Asian case, coming from combination of the liberalized capital accounts and the impact information-impelled movements of large international funds.
Private, as opposed to Public, Sector Locus
Because most of the countries came from the region, the international debt crisis of the 1980s was almost thought of as a Latin American crisis. One Asian country, the Philippines, and a few African countries did participate in the crisis. For Latin America, the 1980s debt crisis was a region-wide phenomenon and lasted at least a decade.
The common elements in the 1980s debt crisis were that large public sector investment-savings deficits were feeding into unsustainable current account deficits which were being financed by private international bank lending. The subsequent forced contraction of imports required to reconcile current account deficits to the reduced external private willingness to lend to these countries when the lending frenzy stopped inflicted a decade-long output contraction on the countries. Investment dried up, public sector expenditure cut back drastically, and the bulk of savings and consumption compression went into the payment of interest on accumulated foreign debt. The possibility of recovery only emerged when significant chunks of the principal were in effect written off through the Brady bond discounts, beginning in
1988.
The debts that brought Latin America low for over a decade were ultimately based on public sector borrowing and when the debt crisis exploded even those debts that had been borrowed by the domestic private sector were rapidly nationalized either through the operation of the government guarantees or as an outcome of debt restructuring negotiations.
The contrast with the Asian debt, and it is ironic since the region had been reputed to be one where the public sector had a strong and successful role in development, is that the largest and most problematical debt in Asia was borrowed by the domestic private sector -banks, finance, companies and corporations. In the case of Indonesia, a majority of the external liabilities were undertaken directly by corporations. The debt is in various forms: credit lines, project financing, bonds.
The prevalence of the strategy of government-guaranteed borrowing in the 1980s explains its pervasiveness; countries that did not undertake too much of this type of borrowing escaped the crisis. In the case of Asia, economies that did not participate to the same extent in external private borrowing boom have also been affected through currency depreciations.
Because of its private nature, it is more difficult to consolidate the debt in Asia. 2 Thus, the debt workout is more complicated in Asia. But it is not necessarily the case the that the debt workout will take longer in Asia than in Latin America. The prolongation of the crisis in Latin America arose from the unwillingness and initial inability of Western deposit money banks to recognize losses on developing country debt. This problem is still operating at this time, but international players have a better understanding that it is better for all involved to recognize losses earlier rather than later. The debt negotiations in Thailand, Korea, and lately Indonesia appear to embody this piece of wisdom from 1980s. 3 What about recovery? For both Latin America of the 1980s and Asia 1990s the critical element is the (1) the rehabilitation of the trade credit system so that exports can restart and (2) recovery of investment spending.
In the case of Latin America, the delay in recognizing losses by foreign creditors was an important factor in delaying recovery. The restoration of investment spirits in Latin America also waited on the completion of the privatization and liberalization efforts that were put in place through the accompanying structural adjustment packages. 2 In the case of the Mexican 1994 crisis, the debt had been consolidated in the dollar denominated government treasury bills, called Treasury bills. Somehow, before the crisis, the Asian private sector elicited more credibility from international financiers than the Latin one and a significant proportion of the lending were made directly to private parties and many individual Asian companies also floated bonds in developed country markets. As it turns out, but as everyone who lent to Asia should have known, bankruptcy procedures, even where the laws are in place, do not operate at all in many instances. The fact that international bankruptcy procedures are also not in place raises the question of whether domestic bankruptcy procedures would be sufficient anyway.
3 However, the Asia debt adjustment is not necessarily secure with the restructuring packages or systems now in place. Further falls in the currency, further widespread bankruptcies -which can be also caused by further currency depreciations, and political upheavals could cause an unraveling of these packages.
For Asia, the natural sluggishness in private sector debt workouts will be an important factor, so the privateness of the debt is a restricting factor that will slow down adjustment. This is not a problem of the Asian private sector; it is a problem of the private sector everywhere. Private companies, especially their own shareholders, tend to be slow in recognizing losses. This delays the sale of these companies to other investors, who face the danger of having to increase provisioning for unknown or unforeseen liabilities in the assets they have purchased.
Domestic banks are sitting on chunks of doubtful claims. These losses have to be recognized as rapidly as possible and either could be liquefied by securitizing them or consolidated into an asset restructuring agency and securitized. Governments are involved in this process (through the imposition of provisioning rules and by the setting up of asset restructuring agencies), but the resistance of domestic shareholders to recognize losses could delay the liquefaction. In the 1980s case when Latin American countries were involved, it was usually the government that was the shareholder of the borrowing company.
Will the Asian crisis last a decade? I sincerely hope not, and it is critical that the Asian private sectors recognize their losses early.
A complicating Asian factor is that a lot of potential private sector losers are well-connected to the government. This is especially true in those countries which the World Bank [1993] had chosen as being in the group of "miracle economies" as a result of good governance, 4 a key part of which was effective business-government coordination. This suggests that addressing the financial sector problem will, at a minimum, chafe at this vaunted coordination, and at a maximum, cause the collapse of governments, even though collapses would be more likely the result of macroeconomic events than bank restructuring.
Even in Indonesia which has, putatively, a new government, this is problematical. The problem with a new government is that into the process of forcing write-offs, one must add investigations on parties associated with the previous regime and the outcome of legal proceedings. In the case of Japan, the intricate system of determining primacy of claim from the proceeds of land sales is complicated by the 4 The Philippines was pointedly excluded from this group. possible claims of criminal groups on loan proceeds. Examples like this abound in the region.
The Credit System as Locus of the Asian Problem
I use "credit system" instead of the financial system, since direct borrowing by corporations, not just financial institutions, constitutes a significant element in the Asian crisis. Saying that regulatory oversight over the finance companies, which were the Achilles heel of the Thai case, and a smaller role in Korea (and also in Scandinavia), is not good enough because of the large role of direct corporate external borrowing in the Indonesian crisis.
The Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay crisis of 1980-83) experience has many of the elements of the Asian situation. In this experience, as in Asia, a lending boom fueled by external private borrowing, followed upon the rapid liberalization of the domestic financial system and opening of the capital account. The same elements happened in Norway, Sweden and Finland between 1988 and 1992, and before 1994 in Mexico.
Rehabilitating and recapitalizing the credit system is a more critical aspect in the Asian than in the Latin American case of the 1980s, where locus of the domestic credit aspect of the crisis were government corporations or government-owned banks.
As pointed earlier, where there were domestic private parties involved in the Latin American case, the credit problems were rapidly socialized with the government taking over the liabilities. Closures and privatization of indebted government corporations and banks were carried out in Latin America. To do this in Latin American, public sector labor unions had to be appeased (or undermined) but when the corporate adjustments were eventually carried out, normal credit operations could theoretically restart. The real constraint to the restart of investment was the slow reflow of capital from external sources and slow restoration of private investment spirits in the light of the controversial structural reforms that the countries were undertaking. Latin American countries were having to put their public finances on a sounder footing and liberalize their trade sectors.
In the case of the 1994 crisis, Mexico's bad debts problem were quickly consolidated into an asset restructuring agency. The extent of the resulting reflow of capital into Mexico was so strong (something I discuss in the next section) that matter VERSION: 8 JUL 1998 09:19 of financing the clean-up of this problem has been postponed. This is now an issue for Mexico.
For Asia, the rehabilitation of the credit system and how it is done is critical. I have already pointed out above the problems inherent in the privateness of the Asian crisis. Here I would like to focus on the credit-centeredness of the Asian crisis. Credit rehabilitation and recovery requires the recognition of losses, their liquefaction, and the recapitalization of credit institutions. For example, in Thailand, there is an estimate of a required recapitalization requirement of $7.5 to 10 billion worth in the next 3 years.
In the Asian case, domestic savings rates are high and unlike Latin America, the reflow of capital from external sources is not a necessary ingredient in credit rehabilitation and recovery for all countries. For credit rehabilitation and recovery, what is needed is a credible plan for adjustment and the stabilization of exchange rates.
The current Malaysian case is a good illustration of the kind of credit sector problems that did not have to be faced in a significant way in Latin America. One might argue that Malaysia, as a nation, has sufficient domestic resources to absorb the bad loan write-offs. The proposal, not subsequently implemented, for addressing the loan problems of the controlling shareholder of the Malaysian Airways System raised fears that Malaysia will undertake a write-off process that will undermine business confidence. If bad loans are transformed from being liabilities of individuals to liabilities of corporations, this would weaken the financial condition of the corporate sector, potentially undermining their equity prices, and causing further banking weaknesses considering that a large proportion of bank collateral are in equity shares.
Credit sector problems are appallingly widespread in Asia and it is appallingly clear that this has had large impact on exchange rates. Japan, which is the most recent collaborator to the Asian crisis, has a credit sector problem that undermines confidence in Japanese savings being invested in yen assets. Addressing this credit sector problem through a leisurely approach to writing off losses, has also required Japan to maintain low domestic interest rates, which sustains the incentive for Japanese savers to move out of yen-denominated financial assets. If Japanese savers cannot be converted into Japanese consumers 5 overnight all the more it is imperative that Japanese financial restructuring be completed quickly.
Historically, a combination of a raid on taxpayer money and money creation has proven the most forthright way to get out of a credit sector problem. Normally, the size of the credit overhang cannot be absorbed through private write-offs, even though private write-offs are required to reduce the cost of the operation, to increase the speed at which specific loan instruments are liquefied, and to restore credit confidence. 6 In a democracy, raiding taxpayer money, as Japan and Scandinavian countries found out, is not straightforward since it requires that sufficient pain be inflicted on those who made hay during lending boom. Arrests, bankruptcies, and in the case especially of Japan, tragically, suicides are part of this process. 7
Japan's experience since 1990 of reluctance and inability to apply the resources from these two routes to resolve its financial instabilities is illustrative of the kinds of controversies that are being replayed in the other Asian economies. Add to this the IMF obsession (perhaps due to the IMF's informational advantage in understanding how private currency markets operate, a rather doubtful claim) over liquidity restriction and high interest rates, and one could argue that the process can be more involved in the other Asian countries.
In regard to money creation, a contrast with regard to the stance of foreign cooperators to the recovery program can be made. The Argentines actually carried out significant money emission (to use a Latin phraseology) to rescue the banking system in response to the Tequila crisis. This is normally a "no no" when running a currency board and the Argentineans did claim that they were determined to maintain 5 In the Latin debt crisis of the 1980s, the U.S. economy most of the time in the doldrums and the U.S. economy could not play the role of an engine of growth. The international, mainly U.S., banks that had lent to Latin America were in no position to absorb the write-offs implied by the crisis when it began in 1982. 6 There will be a period, unavoidably, in which the government and government agencies will be holding equity and participating in management in financial and industrial enterprises. 7 Raiding taxpayer money was a politically possible strategy in Latin America since government companies had been involved and democracy was only a gleam in the Latin eye when the debt crisis began. However, the Latin Americans had limited taxpayer resources to raid just at the point when the crisis struck. their system in the face of the crisis. Argentina's friends in the international community, including the IMF, and the private market apparently permitted Argentina the liquidity leeway during the crisis, something that has proven very difficult for the Thais and the Koreans to obtain from the IMF.
Moreover, exchange rate stability is indispensable to the recapitalization of the domestic credit system; otherwise, it would be wise for residents to hold their assets in foreign currencies. The process can feed into each other and at this juncture it is critical for Japan to as quickly as possible get its financial house in order.
What does the credit-locus of the Asian problem bode for the future? One would hope that Japan's long-running experience will not become the norm in the other Asian economies.
Role of Internationalized Asset Markets
The contrasting role of nationals, both resident and non-resident, against those of non-nationals provided some analytical edge to understanding Latin currency attacks. Before the 1994 Mexican crisis, it appeared, for example, that non-nationals continued to be optimistic about Mexico's medium-term prospects while the nationals were quietly increasing their assets outside of Mexico. The role of this so-called "heterogeneity of expectations" will undoubtedly be the subject of formal study in the Asian cases in the future. For all the economies, as we have described above, the private-ness and the credit-centeredness of the crisis complicates recovery, but it is also the case the continued uncertainty in exchange rates complicates attempts to provide a basis for the return of resident assets and to recapitalize the financial system. The currency instability has lasted quite a long time Asia. For the length of time period since their crises began, the Thai baht standard deviation is 55 per cent more than that of the Mexican peso. The addition of the Japanese yen fall since November 1997 has added its own volatility to the Asian currencies.
Undoubtedly charges that the U.S. moved too quickly in early 1995 to bailout its own pension funds explain part of the U.S. hesitation in dealing with the Asian crisis; U.S. exposure to Asia was also less than that of Japan and Europe. 9 It was only in December, with a tour of the countries by U.S. officials did it appear that the U.S. was taking the crisis seriously. As explained earlier, the privateness of the crisis might have also precluded a quick bailout in the style of Mexico of private claims in the region. But perhaps, this would have been a conjuncture in which currency support and intervention might have been appropriate. 10 One might have interpreted the Asian crisis by October-November 1998 as a liquidity crisis, akin to a bank-run in domestic contexts where most of the banking system is still thought to be solvent, brought about by the sudden demand by Asian residents for U.S. dollars in the face of uncertainty over how low currency values would fall. There was a dollar shortage in the region that was forcing currency values to fall quite out-of-line with restoring external balance. Exchange rates, having fallen so much, had been transformed for most Asian economies from being a "symptom" to being a cause for further domestic financial instability.
What appears to be called for to stabilize the situation is (1) for the G7 countries, especially the U.S., to prevent any further depreciation of the yen and (2) for the Asian countries, using funds mostly raised from Japanese guarantees and applying American conditionality, to implement an exchange stabilization arrangement. In regard to the first, private markets have been waiting for this move since before the G7 finance ministers' meeting in Birmingham in late February. Most everyone knew Japan was about to go into recession, most everyone knew the constraints of the Japanese political cycle, and Japan had scheduled its Big Bang on 1 April 1998.
The impact of the U.S. intervention at the end-of-June highlights the prickly and information-driven nature of exchange markets 11 and the importance of steady stance in exchange stabilization, at least until the crisis subsides. After the intervention, the yen fell ahead of an emergency meeting of G7 deputy finance ministers and their Asian counterparts in Tokyo, 20 June 1998, unlike before the immediately three previous G7-related meetings. One could ask whether after three experiences, currency markets associated these meetings as resulting in no intervention. Efforts by U.S. treasury Secretary in a public interview to dampen expectations from the Tokyo meeting were a key element; that these efforts had to made to avert an over-strengthening of the yen followed by an over-correction which would have required more intervention indicates the hair trigger nature of the problem.
In regard to the second element, there had been a $100 billion proposal in September 1997 to help stabilize Asian currencies, but this had been slapped down by the U.S. and the IMF from feelings of insecurity and being left out of the proposal.
Currency markets in the developing countries in Asia are quite thin and susceptible to intervention. It remains for the U.S. to agree on the conditionalities under which this fund which can be raised through Japan would be used.
It remains to list why the U.S. might find it in its interest, as it seemed to have found it in its interest in the Tequila crisis, to play a more active and sympathetic role in the crisis. Here I borrow the arguments from McKinnon [1998] . The U.S. has virtually unlimited access to the international credit markets, as governments, central banks flock to U.S. bonds and financial assets. But as also the prime issuer of international liquidity, the U.S. might find it in its interest to make sure that the liquidity crises do not cause the world payments to seize up and ultimately for the meltdown in the Asian economies to affect is own economic performance. U.S. politicians can be told that the U.S. is already borrowing tremendously from abroad and extracting significant seignorage. U.S. support for the yen would constitute the partial return of liquidity internationally that the U.S. economy is now withdrawing from the rest of the VERSION: 8 JUL 1998 09:19 world. McKinnon [1998, p. 7] actually says that "the U.S. has a moral imperative -as well as its own economic interests -at stake in acting effectively as the lender of last resort."
Without exchange stabilization, financial market rehabilitation will be problematical in Asia. Without financial market recovery there can be little economic growth. Without reasonable prospects for economic growth, financial companies will remain weak and investment cannot recover. In the 1980s Latin American crisis, it was the excruciating recovery of investment that caused the so-called "L-shaped" recovery. In order to get out of the slump, strong public interventions were requirednotably the Brady bond write-offs and the set of structural adjustment programs.
Without strong public interventions, but of a different sort as I have pointed out above, Asia faces the prospect of a long and reversal-prone recovery.
